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ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things (IoT) has facilitated services without human intervention for a wide range of
applications including continuous Remote Patient Monitoring (RPM). However, the complexity of RPM
architectures, the size of datasets generated and limited power capacity of devices make RPM challenging.
In this paper, we propose a tier based End-to-End architecture for continuous patient monitoring that has
a Patient Centric Agent (PCA) as its center piece. The PCA manages a Blockchain component to preserve
privacy when data streaming from body area sensors needs to be stored securely. The PCA based architecture
includes a lightweight communication protocol to enforce security of data through different segments of
a continuous, real time patient monitoring architecture. The architecture includes the insertion of data
into a personal Blockchain to facilitate data sharing amongst healthcare professionals and integration into
electronic health records while ensuring privacy is maintained. The Blockchain is customized for RPM with
modifications that include having the PCA select a Miner to reduce computational effort, enabling the PCA
to manage multiple Blockchains for the same patient, and the modification of each block with a prefix tree to
minimize energy consumption and incorporate secure transaction payments. Simulation results demonstrate
that security and privacy can be enhanced in Remote Patient Monitoring with the PCA based End to End
architecture.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, Body Area Sensor Network, Healthcare, Remote Patient Monitoring, Patient
Centric Agent, Proof of Work, Streamed Data, Internet of Things, Dynamically Generated Session Key,
Patient Record Encryption Key.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things(IoT) [1] applications in the modern health-
care system include devices, services and wireless sensors
that detect physiological signs with wearable or ingestible
sensors [2] that stream data to remote, and often Cloud based
servers. Secure continuous monitoring of patient’s physio-
logical signs [3] has the potential to augment traditional
medical practice, particularly in developing countries that
have a shortage of healthcare professionals [4], [5], [6].
Remote Patient Monitoring(RPM) [7] involves the inte-
gration of physiological data collected with Wearable or Im-
plantable Medical Devices(IMDs), with other data including
demographic, health record and geographic location data.
The challenges of designing effective, efficient and secure
remote patient monitoring systems include the aggregation
and indexing of huge streams of continuous data while main-
taining patient privacy. Privacy [8] refers to one’s personal
space that also includes the capacity to have control over data
and determine access levels to be granted to others.
In 2013 [9], an alarming 44 percent of all registered data
in targeted medical companies was breached. Data breaches
reportedly increased by 60 percent from 2013 to 2014 which
led to financial losses that increased by a remarkable 282 per-
cent. The vulnerability of wireless communications and rel-
atively weaker cryptographic techniques compared to wired
communications make RPM communications an easy target
[10].
The threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
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of healthcare information come from insiders, and outsiders
in addition to operational environments [11]. Insiders such as
healthcare professionals and support staff, service providers,
and outsiders such as hackers threaten health information
security by gaining unauthorized access to confidential data.
Actions by unauthorized persons can result in alteration of
patient’s information and can even cause death. Breaches of
privacy can erode trust that patients and health care profes-
sionals place in the system.
Software disruption caused by viruses, worms, and mal-
ware, in addition to resource misuse such as personal use
of systems can also threaten health information systems.
Communication infiltration, interception, embedded mali-
cious code and repudiation of patient’s data pose threats to
the confidentiality and integrity of patient’s data. Accidental
misrouting, technical infrastructure failure, and operational
errors can also jeopardize the security of health information.
As outlined in the next section, existing RPM architectures
are yet to address these threats. Therefore, there is a need for
architectures that afford greater protection of RPM devices
and software against attacks.
An eHealth framework [12] for RPM requires that privacy
should be preserved while enabling access by authorized
healthcare professionals.
Efforts to ensure privacy in RPM have been made in
recent years however most approaches focus on a single link
in the architecture that chains data from patient sensors to
health care professionals through intermediary devices and
servers. The archetypal RPM architecture involves sensors
near, on or in the patient transmitting data wirelessly using
Bluetooth, ZigBee or customized protocols, through a Body
Area Wireless Sensor Network to a Base station that initially
process data and transmits it to remote servers for further
processing.
An effective and efficient RPM needs to address issues of
rapid storage at appropriate security levels, user authentica-
tion, access control, mobility management and sustainability
of patient’s health data.
In this article, an End-to-End eHealthcare architecture is
advanced that addresses RPM healthcare data management
issues to ensure that appropriate levels of trade-off between
effectiveness and privacy can be established for rapid, se-
cure data storage and access, user authentication, role based
access, and sustainability . Key features of the architecture
include a Patient Centric Agent to co-ordinate End-to-End
data streams and a Blockchain component for distributed
storage of parts of the data.
Rapid Storage and Access: Large volumes of data
streams can be generated by body area sensors. Some con-
ditions such as a sudden arrhythmia may demand a quick
response [13]. However, the analysis of a patient’s data to
determine appropriate actions as data rapidly streams in from
sensors challenges computational processing and storage re-
sources. Further, not all of the data generated from patient’s
body sensors can be assumed to be sensitive or required
to be stored [14]. Some raw data streams may even be
replaced with simple descriptors over aggregated data such as
"normal heart rate pattern" for 24 hours or the result of real
time analyses such as those proposed [15], [16], [17], [18].
Chung et al. [15] defined a threshold of separating normal
and abnormal ECG data. The ECG signals which width is
less than 100 ms and the R-to-R interval is between 0.8s
and 0.9s or width less than 60ms, and the R-to-R interval
goes beyond 1.1s are classified as Normal ECG waveform.
The signals that do not fall in this range are classified as
abnormal ECG data. Other streamed data can be presumed to
need to be stored but without strong encryption. This means
that a process is required to rapidly determine and execute a
Data Storage Security Level required for a stream of data.
A Patient Centric Agent, described below is proposed to
perform the role of determining the data storage security level
required. The PCA performs three main functions:-
User Authentication: Only authenticated nodes should
participate in the transfer of data to prevent attackers inter-
cepting data flows. Although asymmetric key cryptography
algorithms ensure data cannot practically be decrypted with-
out the key, they cannot guarantee the owner of a public key
is the legitimate owner without the involvement of a trusted
authority to issue public/private key pairs. But reliance on
trusted authorities for key management results in security,
fault tolerance and bottleneck problems in IoT settings [19].
In RPM, a compromised trusted authority might stop the real-
time monitoring of all of the patient’s physiological data. Fur-
ther, asymmetric key cryptography [10] is computationally
expensive and places great demands on power constrained
battery operated devices essential in RPM architectures. The
key management is performed by the PCA as a Trusted center
at patient’s end. The PCA uses symmetric key cryptography
for BSN and asymmetric cryptography for SDP and cus-
tomized Blockchain.
Role Based Access: Role Based Access Control(RBA)
[20] refers to restricted privileges of healthcare professionals
on patient data according to their expertise or roles. A pa-
tient’s physiological data may contain sensitive information
where a patient prefers access to be restricted to selected
physicians. Inappropriate interpretation of health data may
lead to incorrect treatment that might eventually result in long
term consequences for a patient’s health. The PCA ensures
Role Based Access using Access Grant Transaction of the
Blockchain.
Sustainability: A financial model is required to ensure
that all participants in the electronic health data storage
service receive appropriate incentives to ensure the eHealth
systems remain sustainable, and affordable. Financial trans-
actions between healthcare professionals, patients, insurers,
government and others are commonplace. So a secured fund
transaction process is required to be included in RPM archi-
tecture.
The framework advanced in this article, includes
Blockchain technology embedded into an End to End ar-
chitecture. Blockchain for cryptocurrencies is a shared, au-
thenticated, auditable and tamper-proof distributed database
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[21]. The anonymous properties of a transaction in digital
currency address some challenges inherent in patient pri-
vacy. But existing Blockchain technology in digital currency
cannot be applied as is, to IoT based RPM data because
of high computational costs and long transaction processing
times. RPM data can stream from sensors so rapidly that it
cannot be feasibly processed and added to a Blockchain in
real time resulting in delays might discourage patients from
using Blockchain. Volunteer miners might also be reluctant
to join Blockchain networks owing to the large storage and
processing requirements.
We propose that RPM challenges can be reduced with
the inclusion of a Patient Centric Agent(PCA). The Patient
Centric Agent(PCA) has oversight over the End to End flow
of data. The PCA determines the storage, security and access
level required at any point in time. The PCA coordinates dif-
ferent segments of RPM such as patient sensors and devices,
Blockchain nodes, and healthcare service provider devices.
The PCA determines whether a stream of data should be
stored in a Blockchain and manages the process, if so. The
PCA executes on a machine with mass memory capacity and
high processing power. No studies to date have advanced the
notion of embedding Patient Centric Agent with customized
Blockchain for RPM.
The PCA based End-to-End RPM architecture securely
connects a patient’s BSN to healthcare providers through
different intermediate devices. It has the following design
elements, explained in more detail throughout the article;
1) Two tiers-One tier deals with the stream and storage
of data. The second tier, called the Healthcare Control
Unit, deals with auditing and key management.
2) A secure communication protocol from BSN to pa-
tient’s smartphone and smartphone to the Patient Cen-
tric Agent(PCA). This involves a lightweight authenti-
cation algorithm that includes dynamically generated
sessional symmetric keys to confirm an End to End
security as well as consumption of less power.
3) A Blockchain customized for RPM. Modifications in-
clude:
• The task of selecting a Miner is left to the PCA so
that computational effort is reduced and multiple
Blockchains can be accommodated.
• The modification of a block with prefix tree to
minimize energy consumption and incorporate se-
cure transaction payments.
The architecture advanced here envisages the PCA playing
a central role enforcing security, mediating access to relevant
electronic health records, storing particularly sensitive RPM
data in a distributed manner, and enabling secure payments.
In the paper, we review related papers in Section IIand
describe our proposed framework in SectionIII. The perfor-
mance of key algorithms in the architecture is demonstrated
in Section IV before concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
We review the state-of-the-art works in three categories:
traditional RPM solutions, attribute based RPM solutions and
Blockchain based RPM solutions.
A. CONVENTIONAL RPM SOLUTIONS
Codeblue [22] is one of the earliest healthcare architectures
developed based on BSN worn by the patient. Medical sen-
sors wirelessly transmit the sensing data to end users such
as PDA(Personal Digital Assistance), laptop, and personal
computer. Healthcare professionals issue queries for the anal-
ysis of patient’s data in a publish-subscribe manner. Although
authors in the Codeblue project highlighted the need for
security and privacy with medical data, they did not include
privacy and security protection in their architecture.
Alarm-net [23] is a heterogeneous network architecture
consisting of body sensor networks and environmental sen-
sors for patient health monitoring in the assisted living and
home environment. The circadian activity rhythms module in
Alarm-net help to adjust context-aware power management
and privacy policies. Alarm-net which is connected to BSN,
back-end server and IP network imposed some network
and data security policies for physiological, environment,
behavioral parameters about residents. However, Wood et al.
[23], [24] showed that Alarm-net could not guard against
the leakage of resident’s location. Further, Kumar et al. [25]
pointed that hardware built in cryptosystem in Alarm-net
makes the application highly platform dependent. Although
Alarm-net performs some initial analysis on sensor data for
power management, it did not focus on storage management,
patient mobility management, security level of streamed
physiological data as our proposal extend these techniques.
UbiMon [26] proposed by Ng et al. is BSN based health-
care system and addresses the issues of wearable and im-
plantable sensors for distributed monitoring. Although Ubi-
Mon is an ubiquitous healthcare architecture consisting of
LUP(Local Processing Unit) that can detect patient’s ab-
normalities and issue instant warning to healhcare service
provider, central server and work station for physician, but
Ng did not consider security and privacy in their ubiquitous
healthcare monitoring architecture. We extended this archi-
tecture by placing a smart agent at the patient’s end and
replace the central server with Blockchain technology. We
also embed proper security at each segment of our architec-
ture. Intelligent analysis of huge streamed physiological data
requires a dedicated patient agent at the patient’s end.
Chakravorty designed a wide-area mobile patient monitor-
ing called MobiCare [27] to collect physiological conditions
of patients continuously. MobiCare improves the quality-of-
patient care and Mobicare server gives access to physio-
logical data off line to medical staff. Although Chakravorty
addressed the security and privacy for real-time applications,
secure localization, and anonymity are not yet implemented.
Sensor Network for Assessment of Patients(SNAP) [28]
has been proposed to address security concerning wireless
health monitoring but it does not authenticate users while
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providing medical data. Furthermore, adversaries can inter-
cept or modify physiological data because text to the con-
troller is not encrypted in the architecture.
MEDiSN [29] consists of multiple physiological motes
powered by a battery for in-hospital patient monitoring.
The MEDiSN architecture addresses the issue of reliable
communication, routing, data rate, and QoS. In the design,
authors expressed the necessity of encrypting physiological
monitoring data, but their study did not report the encryption
technique that ensures confidentiality and integrity.
Moosavi [30] proposed an End-to-End security scheme
for mobility enabled healthcare IoT. The End-to-End Secu-
rity Scheme architecture consists of three-layers, the device
layer(BSN), fog layer(gateways, network router), and Cloud
layer. Moosavi proposed a secure and efficient end-user
authentication and authorization architecture based on the
certificate DTLS(Datagram Transport Layer Security) hand-
shake, secure end-to-end communication based on session
resumption, and robust mobility based on interconnected
smart gateways. DTLS depends on a trust center and involves
a higher number of flights to complete the authentication
process. Storage of physiological data in the Cloud causes
higher latency and consumes bandwidth for continually mon-
itoring healthcare system. Furthermore, Moosavi et al. did
not focus on access control on patient’s data in the Cloud. We
advance our End-to-End e-healthcare architecture incorporat-
ing Blockchain technology, which includes a secure payment
system and employ more lightweight authentication at the
patient’s end. A trusted authority in our architecture has a
role to play in certifying healthcare professionals through
Blockchain.
Gope [12] proposed a modern healthcare system called
BSN-Care for RPM. BSN-Care architecture includes con-
ventional devices such as BSN, Local Processing Unit(LPU)
and BSN-Care Server in healthcare monitoring system. In
BSN-Care, BSN-Care Servers analyze patient physiological
data transferred by LPU using heuristic approach. BSN-Care
Server alerts healthcare givers if physiological data exceed
a preset thresholds. Gope proposed a one-way hash based
lightweight authentication method that uses shadow identity
to preserve patient privacy and security. Data processing
may bottleneck because the architecture depends on a single
server. Yeh [31] also used the architecture of BSN-Care. He
proposed hash based public/private key authentication LPU
to BSN-Care Server and a hash based lightweight authenti-
cation integrating GPS for BSN to LPU.
In this work, we extend the BSN-Care lightweight au-
thentication by including proximity and HMAC [32](keyed-
Hash Message Authentication Code) for Body Area Sensor
Network to smartphone communication channel. Proximity
helps BSN devices in RPM to detect attacker’s devices
because of their physical location. In proximity authentica-
tion, two entities estimate distances between each other by
exchanging some signals such as radio or voice. Therefore,
device cannot claim incorrect physical location during au-
thentication. We include GPS and options for using differ-
ent kinds of encryption algorithms for smartphone to PCA
communication channel. Spoof attack can be prevented by
GPS. Option on using different encryption algorithm along a
communication channel delays the attacker’s effort to break
data confidentiality.
Central Server based architecture [22]- [31] serves to store
and analyze health records of limited number of patients.
Therefore, we propose a scalable healthcare architecture inte-
grating customized Blockchain, which is scalable and robust
against attacks.
B. ATTRIBUTE BASED RPM SOLUTIONS
Attribute based authentication [33] refers to validating en-
tities/persons on conditions that they possesses a certain
number of attributes such as a person must be a doctor,
heart specialist and service experience of 10 years to ac-
cess a patient’s record with heart diseases. A trust party
ensures that a person owns the required properties in at-
tribute based authentication and encryption. Two attribute-
oriented authentication and transmission schemes for secure
and privacy-preserving health information sharing in health
social networks (HSNs) that is a social platform like Twitter
for patients and healthcare service providers to share medical
records and their views are proposed in [34] where the access
policy is defined by a target set of attributes such as patient
identity, diseases history, and social status. Only users who
satisfy the access policy are able to decrypt the cipher text.
Privacy is preserved in this approach because it does not
require the identity of the entity. They demonstrate that the
proposed schemes can effectively resist various attacks in-
cluding forgery attack, attribute-trace attack, eavesdropping
attack, and collusion attack. However, authors didn’t focus
on revocation that refers to remove the access capabilities of
authorized users any time and write operation on attribute-
based encrypted medical data. Lounis [35] pointed that med-
ical data encrypted on attributes in the Cloud needs to be
downloaded and stored again if the access policy associated
with attributes changes. The computational cost of attribute
based cryptosystems increases linearly with the number of
attributes. The papers used symmetric key to encrypt data
files in Cloud. The symmetric key is encrypted with access
policies associated with attributes. Therefore, symmetric key
requires to be encrypted if access policy is changed.
Liang [36] also used patient’s attributes to ensure authen-
tication in smart home based pervasive healthcare system
while communicating to online healthcare provider. To pre-
serve a patient’s location privacy, a receiver chain is formed
where the source node requests a neighbor node to be a proxy
source to enable vendor-to-patient communication. However,
the source node can still be traced along the chain. Li [37]
proposed a scalable personal health records to be stored
in the Cloud using attribute based encryption so that pa-
tient’s record can be securely shared with multi-authority by
maintaining appropriate privacy. The scheme also supports
the dynamic modification of attribute policies, on-demand
user/attribute revocation and break-glass access at the time
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of emergencies. Although attribute based encryption schemes
provides security and privacy of patient’s record, the scheme
is not lightweight enough to implement in wearable medical
sensors and smartphone [38].
C. BLOCKCHAIN BASED RPM SOLUTIONS
In the End to End frameworks proposed by [22]- [37], the
patient must depend on Trusted Centers for key management.
The devices that streamed real-time data in RPM experienced
higher latency and communication overhead to obtain keys
from Trusted Centers. Further, these frameworks don’t ensure
the availability of patient’s data if the traditional server or
Cloud server is compromised. Single point health applica-
tions described by [39] have some drawbacks such as when
a user goes to another hospital, the previous hospital may be
reluctant to share data. Further, healthcare professionals can
violate privacy by providing patient’s data to a third party.
Health data might suffer from a single point of failure.
In addition, traditional remote patient monitoring system
requires authorization between remote end user/healthcare
center and medical devices at the patient’s end. The au-
thorization causes communication overhead (required band-
width, computational overhead, the number of transmitted
message ).
Blockchain healthcare architecture reduces the commu-
nication overhead to eliminate the requirements of running
authorization algorithm for the remote end user to access
data from the Blockchain [40], [41]. Further, Blockchain
healthcare provides the facilities of peer-to-peer record’s
transmission without the involvement of third party trust, in-
terpretability of longitudinal healthcare records, transparency
with pseudonymity and irreversibility of records. Patients in
Blockchain have options to hide their identity with alphanu-
meric address or show proof of their identity to others [40].
On the other hand, Blockchain technology applied in
RPM involves a high-cost consensus process, IoT data can
plausibly be generated faster than Blockchain consensus ap-
proach can validate the proof of concept [42]. An optimized
Blockchain is required in order to preserve privacy in IoT
based remote patient monitoring.
Zhang et al. [43] introduced a modified IEEE 802.15.6
authentication association protocol by considering the lim-
ited processing power of sensor nodes for pervasive social
network based healthcare between BSN and smartphone.
IEEE 802.15.6 requires two scalar multiplications at the BSN
end and two scalar multiplications at the smartphone. In
modified 802.15.6, sensor device performs one scalar mul-
tiplication. Secondly, they use a Blockchain oriented archi-
tecture that consists of the body area wireless sensor network
and PSN(powerful computer, laptop, and smartphone build
this network). They included a coordinator node(smartphone)
placed at user end, which broadcasts transaction among
PSN to verify its signature( using the master key exchanged
through the modified protocol described in the first part of
their works) of the sensor and the node itself. The transaction
of Blockchain in this proposal doesn’t contain physiological
health record. The transaction includes patient or healthcare
providers’ meta data such as identity, address, and diseases.
Their modified IEEE 802.15.6 still involves high computa-
tion for BSN because scalar multiplication is computation-
ally expensive operation.
Bowhead [44] is a Blockchain based healthcare applica-
tion. The application introduces some medical devices such
as test cartridge, test reader and dispensing devices to capture
patient data. They have also designed an App that prompts
patients about the dosage and time of taking medication. The
user can provide his information to Bowhead’s application
through different body area medical sensors and the applica-
tion stores that information to a Blockchain based database.
Although white paper describes the procedure for collect-
ing patients data, it does not describe how the stream of
medical data produced from patients body fit to the existing
Blockchain.
MeDShare [45] is also a medical data sharing system
among Cloud service provider via Blockchain contract. The
contract refers to a program written by user defining terms
and conditions of an agreement. The Blockchain nodes only
justify the rules of the agreement. The authors propose an ar-
chitecture for sharing documents among requestors. In design
approach, they discussed the system setup, requested file,
package delivery, auditing and provenance in detail where
the function of each layer of their architecture and smart
contact technology in Blockchain are integrated to share data
securely. However, MedShare constitutes only a sub-system
in RPM architecture.
Health Care Data Gateway(HDG) [46] is a smartphone
based App that integrates traditional database and Blockchain
distributed database to manage patient health data. They pro-
posed a multiparty computation(MPC) approach where third
parties can access data but not alter data. HDG consists of
three layers called Storage Layer, Data Management Layer,
and Data Usage Layer. Cloud is the platform for Storage
Layer in Blockchain fashion. The Data Management Layer
comprises individual devices. All kinds of request either
incoming or outgoing will pass through this layer. The Data
Management Layer helps in indexing and making queries
to retrieve data from the Cloud. Data Usage Layer includes
physicians, electronic medical record system, and data ana-
lytical algorithms. The diagnostic center will directly send
data to patients and patients transfer authority for the data to
the doctor for further analysis. The third party might continue
analyzing data without accessing user’s data through MPC
in the Blockchain. They proposed a unified scheme to store
medical data. The paper does not mention how consensus
mechanism and auditing processing work in Cloud based
Blockchain.
The proposal might be integrated with the body area sensor
network. Yue et al. [46] do not show how patient record
can be encrypted or accessed at granular level and how
Blockchain tackles stream of medical sensor data. In IoT
healthcare, one key for all the users in the Blockchain raises
privacy risk and one key for every individual involved in
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the Block chain is also not feasible because user might be
still identified through inspection and analysis of available
open information on the Blockchain [47]. Moreover, the key
should vary for every chunk of data block in the Blockchain.
Zhao et al. [39] proposed a fuzzy vault based key man-
agement in Blockchain health architecture. The architecture
of the Blockchain based health framework includes wearable
sensor nodes on the patient’s body, some implanted nodes
and gateway nodes for the body area sensor networks. The
Gateway collects physiological data from wearable sensor
nodes and sends aggregated data to some pointed hospital
which individually make a block in Blockchain and mes-
sage generated from the Gateway is considered as a single
block. Wearable sensor nodes produce a key before sending
physiological data to the Gateway node and encrypt the data
with the key generated from the signal of patient’s body.
Blockchain communities or healthcare professionals cannot
leak the patient information. The patient can only recover the
key from her physiological data to decrypt data. However,
this approach causes significant burden for power constrained
medical sensors because these sensors require to construct
the key from patients’ physiological data during decryption.
Linn et al. [48] planned an off Blockchain approach for
health data storage called Data Lake and a Blockchain con-
taining all authorization transactions. Data in an encrypted
format is stored as key-value pairs in the data lake. The user,
health data provider, and doctor use mobile apps to access
data through Blockchain from the data lake. After completing
analyses such as different types of medical tests, the provider
inserts a signature and authenticates a user to access that
result through Blockchain. In the same way, the user can
offer authentication and authorization of its data to a doctor
through Blockchain. They do not show the design elements
of Blockchain and off Blockchain does not provide the access
to the medical record that healthcare providers need.
In eHealth frameworks, the mechanism to provide the
patient’s data to health professionals is not highlighted in
central server based architecture. On the other hand, streamed
data is generated from the medical sensors in continu-
ous patient monitoring system, the current architecture of
Blockchain based healthcare also overlooks the efficient
processing of huge stream of patient’s data so that patients
get a rapid response from healthcare professionals. There is
still a need to design an End-to-End eHealthcare framework
merging Blockchain with legacy healthcare architecture.
III. PROPOSED SECURE PATIENT MONITORING
ARCHITECTURE
The proposed architecture comprises two tiers; the lower tier
provides the data streaming and storage solution whereas
the upper tier manages keys healthcare provider and is
called Healthcare Control Unit(HCU). The lower tier in-
cludes six systems illustrated in Fig. 1 . Body Area Sensor
Network(BSN), Sensor Data Provider(SDP) such as smart-
phone, Patient Centric Agent(PCA), Blockchain, Health-
care Provider Agent(HPA) and Healthcare Provider’s Wal-
let(HPW). In Fig. 1, BSN is connected to Patient Centric
Agent(PCA) through Sensor Data Provider such as a smart-
phone. PCA is connected to Blockchain network, Cloud
and the Healthcare Control Unit. Healthcare Provider Agent
connects Blockchain, Healthcare Control Unit and Health-
care Wallet at healthcare provider end. The architecture is
explained in accordance to the communication links between
different segments below and the functional view of the
architecture is depicted in Fig. 2. The architecture is designed
to scale to large numbers of patients.
A. BODY AREA SENOSR TO SENSOR DATA PROVIDER
In this section, we discuss BSN and SDP, and mutual authen-
tication process between these two segments.
1) Body Area Sensor Network(BSN)
Different types of wearable sensor devices such as motion
tracker, biophysiological sign measurement devices(EEG,
ECG, BSC etc.) [49] form the Body Area Sensor Network.
In our architecture, we also consider n number of wireless
wearable sensor devices measuring physiological signs in the
Body Area Sensor Network(BSN). Devices in BSN are ex-
tremely power constrained and have very limited processing
power [50]. Typically, these devices send patient’s data to a
nearby smartphone using the Bluetooth or ZigBee protocol
[38].
2) Sensor Data Provider(SDP)
The Sensor Data Provider(SDP) is software that executes on a
mobile device, cellphone or modem. We assume that a patient
has a dedicated smartphone to receive health data from
medical sensors in BSN and wirelessly provides the data to
the Patient Centric Agent (PCA) described in III-B. The data
stream generated from a sensor is partitioned by the SDP
in variable size data frame windows [51]. For instance, the
size of the window is set by the SDP for each variable using
simple heuristics and varies according to the fluctuations in
data rates. The SDP does not perform any aggregation of data
such as packaging heart rate and breath rate streams together.
Further, the SDP does not pre-process data to remove outliers
or abnormal values.
The SDP includes two components. A Security Service
Module(SSM) performs cryptographic operations such as
key generation, authentication, encryption and decryption
and a Patient Mobility Management Module continues trans-
mitting patient’s physiological data to PCA using long range
communication standards such as NB-IoT [38] while patient
moves to a new place.
Public/Private encryption requires devices having consid-
erable processing power [52]. Wireless sensors in BSN lack
the processing power required for public key encryption.
Furthermore, confirmation of ownership’s legitimacy of pub-
lic/private key is not feasible without a third party trust
center. Although symmetric key authentication is a promising
solution for the BSN to SDP segment, key sharing is vul-
nerable to man in middle attack. According to Malina [10],
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FIGURE 1: The tier based Remote Patient Monitoring architecture.
Proximity based User Authentication(PUA) introduced by
[53] can address the key exchange challenges of IoT devices
with power and memory limitations.
3) Authentication BSN to SDP
We design a mutual authentication approach by inte-
grating Proximity User Authentication(PUA) and HMAC
[32](keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code) for BSN
to SDP channel. The mutual authentication is a two way
authentication where both entities in the communication link
prove their identities to one another. Entities in PUA perform
their authentication based on their physical distance. In RPM
healthcare system, legitimate medical sensors attached to the
patient’s body and smartphone in SDP are usually closer than
attacker’s devices. Therefore, intrusion to patient’s medical
sensors will not be successful thanks to attacker’s position
even if it can discover the legitimate device’s session key that
is used to produce HMAC.
Radio signal based proximity measurement [54], [55] esti-
mates distance between entities in a communication link by
exchanging radio signals. Two entities in close proximity to
each other can be assumed to transmit stronger radio signals
however radio signals can be easily manipulated by attackers
[53]. However, voice signal introduced by [54] requires less
power than radio signal to measure the proximity between
two entities.
Therefore, voice signal is used in the proposed authenti-
cation process to estimate the distance between two entities
and to prove their legitimate identities. Voice based Prox-
imity(VP) has some limitations. An attacker might play a
recording of the voice while person is asleep and the process-
ing of VP in BSN device adds much computational burden
on extremely power constraint medical sensor. Therefore, we
presume that BSN and SDP device store the legitimate user’s
voice and have also a voice or audio processing unit.
a: Mutual Authentication Protocol
The lightweight authentication protocol confirms SDP re-
ceives physiological data from the legitimate patient wearing
medical sensors. We assume that BSN and SDP devices
produce a sessional symmetric key(Ki) for authentication
through a dynamic key generation mechanism described in
III-B3. The mutual authentication BSN to SDP is depicted
in Fig. 3. Here, the authentication process starts with the
BSN speaking to the SDP. H() represents Blake2 message
digestion code and HMAC represents Marvin message au-
thentication code. Pereira et al. [56] showed that Blake2
Hash and Marvin MAC outperform other approaches in IoT
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FIGURE 2: Conceptual view of the tier based health monitoring architecture
devices in terms of speed and energy. HMAC is faster and
requires less computational cost in terms of processing power
than public/private key pairs. The cryptographic notions and
meaning are illustrated in Table 1. The mutual authentication
process is described as follows:
• Firstly, BSN initiates authentication by sending the SDP
device a transmission that consists of two messages: An
information message consisting of time, nonce, and user
voice signal; an HMAC of time, nonce, and voice signal
to ensure the integrity of the flight. Here, time, nonce,
and user voice signal are encrypted with a one-time pad
to hide them from the attacker.
BSN → SDP The BSN device randomly chooses a
nonce(Ns) and uses system time(Times) to confirm the
freshness of the authentication message. Times guards
against reply attack and nonce is also used as dynamic
identities of BSN and SDP devices during transmission
of health data. BSN device performs XOR(⊕) operation
on the nonce and H() of symmetric key(Ki) to produce
Xs ← H(Ki)⊕Ns that hides the nonce from attackers.
Likewise, Ys represents one time pad of voice signal and
it is produced as Ys ← H(Ns)⊕Vs where Vs represents
voice stored in BSN. BSN produces an information mes-
sage Is ← Times‖Xs‖Ys. The attacker might intercept
and change information message(Is). Therefore, BSN
computes Ts ← HMAC(Ki, Is) where Ts represents
the HMAC produced from Is using a sessional symmet-
ric key(Ki). BSN device sends Is and Ts to SDP device.
Here, Ts ensures that Is are produced by BSN device.
• Secondly, the SDP device receives the flight from BSN
device over an insecure channel and decrypts the infor-
mation message provided that the verification of HMAC
is successful. Next, SDP estimates the distance between
the origin of the voice(BSN) and itself if the voice from
BSN is identical to SDP’s stored voice. After that the
SDP also prepares a flight consisting of its information-
Time, Nonce, Distance and its Voice, and HMAC of
these information using a dynamically generated sym-
metric key at BSN and SDP end. The SDP also sends its
flight to BSN for mutual authentication.
SDP → BSN SDP produces T ∗ ← HMAC(Ki, Is)
upon receiving Is and Ts from BSN using the same
session symmetric key(Ki). SDP extracts nonce(Ns ←
H(Ki) ⊕ Xs) and voice(V ← H(Ns) ⊕ Ys) if
T∗ = Ts. SDP measures distance(D)between the ori-
gin of the voice and the SDP from voice signal(Vs)
provided that Vs = Vm(voice stored in SDP device).
If distance(D) between BSN and SDP doesn’t exceed
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FIGURE 3: Mutual authentication BSN to SDP.
TABLE 1: The cryptography notions and meanings
(⊕) XOR operation
H() Blake2 Hash operation
HMAC()/MMAC() Marvin Hash Authentication Code
Ki Dynamically generated sessional symmetric key
T imes BSN device’s system time
Ns Nonce generated by BSN device
Vs User voice/audio stored in BSN device
Xs One time pad produced from BSN device’s Nonce and H(Ki)
Ys One time pad produced from BSN’s voice/audio and H(Ns)
Is Information message consisting of T imes,Xs,Ys from BSN
T imem BSN device’s system time
Nm Nonce generated by SDP device(mobilephone)
Vm User voice/audio stored in SDP device
Xm One time pad produced from SDP device’s Nonce and H(Ki||Ns)
Ym One time pad produced from SDP’s voice/audio and H(Nm)
Im Information message consisting of T imem,Xm,Ym from SDP
pubKeym Public key of SDP device
privateKeym Private key of SDP device
pubKeya Public key of PCA
privateKeya Private key of PCA
Ia Encrypted Information Message from PCA
the threshold distance(Dth)set by the PCA, then SDP
also randomly chooses a nonce(Nm) and computes
Xm ← H(Ki||Ns) ⊕ Nm, Ym ← H(Nm) ⊕ D, and
Zm ← H(Ki‖Nm) ⊕ Vm. SDP forms an information
message Im ← Timem‖Xm‖Ym‖Zm and produces
Tm ← HMAC(Ki, Im) where HMAC’s result of Im
using the symmetric key. SDP device sends Im and Tm
to BSN device.
• Thirdly, the BSN verifies the flight from SDP in a
similar fashion.
BSN → SDP BSN verifies Tm and extracts Nm, D
and Vm to check if Vs = Vm.
B. SENSOR DATA PROVIDER TO PATIENT CENTRIC
AGENT
The Patient Centric Agent that embeds Blockchain with SDP
and BSN at the patient’s end is discussed in this section.
Following that, the mutual authentication process between
SDP and PCA, sessional symmetric key generation and the
communication protocol for BSN, SDP and PCA are dis-
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cussed.
1) Patient Centric Agent(PCA)
The Patient Centric Agent is software that executes on a
patient’s laptop, desktop or a dedicated server. The patient
agent node contains three modules: medical Data Manage-
ment Module(DMM), Security Service Module(SSM), and
Miner Management Module(MMM). The agent node plays a
critical role in our architecture and the functionality of each
component is described as follows:
• Data Management Module(DMM): Continuous pa-
tient monitoring system generates huge volumes of
data [13]. However, some data is not required to be
stored at all, whereas other data requires storage with
strong encryption. For instance, unusual heart patterns
in cardiovascular patients is likely to be clinically useful
and would normally be stored. An intelligent module
is needed to determine the level of storage required for
each data stream [57]. The module classifies patient’s
data as Normal, Eventful and Uneventful following [58],
[59]. The module stores uneventful data locally and
also sends uneventful patient’s data to Cloud in case
healthcare professionals requires the data. We do not
discard any physiological signal of the patient, because
even uneventful data may be useful for some future
purpose such as research. Further, physiological data
compression [60], [61], [62] that requires high compu-
tational cost is performed in DMM instead of BSN.
• Miner Management Module(MMM): The PCA par-
ticipates in storing streamed data in a Block. The PCA,
through its MMM might also act as a Miner in case no
other Miners respond within a certain time. The module
runs the Miner Selection Algorithm(MSA). The MMM
and Cloud also form a Blockchain containing uneventful
data. The module also collects network information
such as availability, CPU resources about Miners in
Blockchain from Healthcare Control Unit(HCU).
• Security Service Module(SSM): The SSM of PCA
continuously analyzes the susceptibility of communica-
tion channels such as BSN to SDP, SDP to PCA and
PCA to BSN to network security attack. The module
excludes devices compromised by attacker in BSN and
SDP. Further, the SMM periodically sends updated key
generation information in BSN and SDP devices. In
Blockchain, public/private key is used to hide user iden-
tity. Patient’s agent might use a set of private/public
key. SSM maps a person’s public key into one of a
few symmetric keys linked to that key and randomly
uses one of the linked keys in place of the public key
for indexing in Blockchain. Otherwise any Miner can
follow a person’s public key down the chain to discover
all transactions.
2) Authentication SDP to PA
Proximity authentication is not appropriate for SDP device
to PCA because of patient’s movement. Here, we include
GPS(Global Positioning System) [31] that protects data from
spoofing attack 1. A channel is considered more secure if the
channel changes data encryption algorithm for a new session,
because attackers do not have knowledge about channel’s
encryption/decryption mode. So, SDP device and PCA agree
on an encryption approach from a predefined algorithm
set(Triple DES, RSA, Blowfish, Twofish, AES(CBC, CTR,
OCB, CCM, GCM) [63]) through authentication. But usage
of different kinds of encryption algorithm at BSN to SDP
channel is not feasible because of resource constraints on
IoT devices in BSN. According to [56], AES-CTR is the
most suitable encryption mode among AES, Curupira and
Trivium for power constrained IoT devices in terms of speed
and energy. BSN to SDP channel uses AES-CTR encryption
mode to preserve health data confidentiality.
PCA might use several public/private key pairs. SDP de-
vice and PCA are required to validate new public/private key.
The session key(Ki) is used to validate new public/private
key in the authentication process so that devices don’t require
third party trusted center to verify public/private key.
a: Mutual Authentication Protocol
• Firstly, SDP device and the PCA require validating new
public/private key pair using their symmetric key as this
involves no third party trusted center to certify pub-
lic/private key of patient’s end’s device. SDP initiates
the authentication protocol by sending a flight formed
by the encrypted public key of SDP using the symmetric
key and encrypted HMAC of the encrypted public key
using SDP’s private key to ensure that attackers have not
changed the encrypted text and the SDP has produced
the HMAC.
SDP → PCA, we suppose that SDP or PCA
has a new public/private key pair. SDP makes two
encrypted text: Xm ← Enc(Ki, pubKeym) and
Pm ← Enc(privateKeym, HMAC(Ki, Xm)) where
pubKeym and privateKeym are public and private
key of a SDP device(mobile phone). Xm is the en-
crypted text of SDP device’s public key using session
key(Ki) and Pm is encrypted text of HMAC(Ki, Xm)
using SDP device’s private key. SDP device sends
the flight(Xm‖Pm) to PCA over an insecure channel.
HMAC(Ki, Xm) and Pm ensure that the owner of
the public key/private key is legitimate and XmandPm
have not been changed by attackers.
• The PCA receives the flight from SDP and decrypts
the public key of SDP using the symmetric key(Ki),
and the HMAC using SDP’s public key which has been
encrypted using SDP’s private key. Similarly, the PCA
makes a flight packing its encrypted public key using
the symmetric key and an encrypted text of HMAC
produced from the encrypted public key.
1A spoofing attack is performed by the attacker or malicious program by
successfully impersonating health data on behalf of patients. ARP, DNS and
IP spoofing are some example of spoofing attack.
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PCA → SDP PCA decrypts Xm to ob-
tain public key of SDP device pubKeym ←
Dec(Ki, Xm)). Next, PCA decrypts Pm to get
P ∗ ← Dec(pubKeym, Pm) and verify if P ∗ =
HMAC(Ki, Xm). After that, PCA also produces
two encrypted text: Xa ← Enc(Ki, pubKeya) and
Pa ← Enc(privateKeya, HMAC(Ki, Xa)) where
pubKeya and privateKeya are public and private key
of the PCA. Xa is encrypted text of PCA’s public key
using a session key(Ki) and Pa is encrypted text of
HMAC(Ki, Xa) PCA’s private key. PCA sends the
flight(Xa‖Pa) to SDP device over an insecure channel.
HMAC(Ki, Xa) and Pa ensure that the owner of the
public key/private key is legitimate and Xa and Pa has
not been changed by attackers as well.
• Secondly, SDP prepares an information message that
contains Time, Nonce, Data Encryption Algorithm, Lo-
cation. SDP first encrypts the information message us-
ing PCA’s public key, and then ciphertext is again en-
crypted by using the symmetric key. Two-time encryp-
tion ensure that only the legitimate PCA can decrypt
the final ciphertext. The SDP produces HMAC of the
ciphertext of information message and encrypts HMAC
twice; first uses its private key and then public key
of the PCA. The SDP transfers PCA the flight having
encrypted information message and HMAC. Encryption
of authentication message using both symmetric key and
public/private key makes sure that an attacker cannot
break the security of the authentication process without
knowing both types of key.
SDP → PCA The SDP(mobile phone) randomly
chooses a nonce(Nm). SDP produces two encrypted
text: Im ← Enc(Ki, Enc(pubKeya, T imem‖Nm
‖EA‖Lm)) that contains information of time(Timem),
nonce(Nm), data encryption algorithm (EA), GPS
location(Lm) of the SDP device and Tm ←
Enc(pubKeya, Enc(privateKeym,
HMAC(Ki, Im))) where PubKeym denotes the pub-
lic key of the SDP device. First encryption in Tm using
private key of SDP private key ensures that encryption is
done by SDP device and second encryption in Tm using
public key of PCA ensures that only PCA can decrypt
and verify the encrypted text.
• The PCA decrypts an information message using its
symmetric key and private key respectively. Next, it
verifies the HMAC of ciphertext of information message
by decrypting it using the private key of PCA and the
public key of SDP as shown in flight 3 of Fig. 4. The
PCA also prepares a flight with it’s information message
and HMAC of ciphertext of the information message.
PCA → SDP PCA decrypts Tm to get T ∗ ←
Dec(pubKeym, Dec(privateKeya, Tm)) upon receiv-
ing the flight(Im‖Tm) from SDP device. If T ∗ =
HMAC(Ki, Im), the PCA decrypts information
Im(I ← Dec(privateKeya, Dec(Ki, Im))) using a
session key(Ki) and its private key(privateKeya)
respectively. Here, attackers can only decrypt in-
formation if both session key and private key of
public/private key pair are known to attackers. Af-
ter that, the PCA randomly chooses a nonce(Na)
and then PCA produces two encrypted text: Ia ←
Enc(Ki, Enc(pubKeym, T imea‖Na‖EA‖La)) that
contains information of time(Timea), nonce(Na), data
encryption algorithm (EA), GPS location(La) of the
PCA and Ta ← Enc(pubKeym, Enc(privateKeya,
HMAC(Ki, Ia))) where PubKeya denotes the public
key of the PCA. First encryption in Ta using private key
of PCA’s private key ensures that encryption is done by
PCA and second encryption in Ta using public key of
SDP device ensures that only legitimate SDP device can
decrypt and verify the encrypted text.
• SDP verifies Ta and decrypts Ia to obtain PCA’s infor-
mation.
In Fig. 4, first two flights(1 & 2) between SDP and PCA
occur to validate new public/private key and second two
flights(3 & 4) represents sharing authentication information.
3) Sessional Symmetric Key Generation
The exchange of symmetric keys for a session is vulnerable
to man in middle attack and also causes higher commu-
nication overhead. BSN, SDP and Patient Centric Agent
in our RPM architecture generate the same session key to
reduce communication overhead and security vulnerability
before performing authentication based on some pre-shared
information by PCA. This means that devices at the patient’s
end do not require a key exchange mechanism for every new
session.
Session Key generation Method: The approach advanced
includes a primary secret key(PSK), a linear feedback
shift register(LFSR) used by [64] sequence generator with
feedback polynomial f(x1, x2, ..., xm), and a hash table(T )
that holds random numbers to generate the session key. The
session key generation process is explained as follows:
• Step 1: Device at patient’s end performs MMAC(Marvin
Message Authentication Code) operation on the
XOR(⊕) operation of linear feedback shift register,
and previously used session key using the primary
secret key(PSK). Marvin Message Authentication
Code(MMAC) that has the best performance in terms
of energy and speed in IoT devices is used as MAC
operation [56].
• Step 2: Another MMAC operation is done on a ran-
dom number taken from a preshared random num-
ber table using the primary secret key(PSK). Later,
a sessional symmetric key is generated by perform-
ing XOR(⊕) operation on the two MMAC results;
the previous MMAC from Step 1 and this MMAC.
Ki =MMAC(PSK, f(x1, x2, x3, ..., xn)⊕Ki−1)⊕
MMAC(PSK, ri)
Where PSK is the primary secret key, Ki−1 and Ki
represents the current and previous session key respec-
tively and ri is a random value from a table(T ) and
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FIGURE 4: The mutual authentication SDP to PCA.
ri = T [i mod n] where n is the total number of random
number in table(T ) and i represents the ith session.
Here, the random number creates immunity against
rainbow table attack2 that refers to 2n input and output
pairs pre-computed and stored in a table [65].
• Step 3: The hash table(T ) containing random numbers
is updated by applying the H() on the value of the table
repeatedly if all of the random numbers have been used
up.
The session key generation algorithm illustrated in Algo-
rithm 1 and in Fig. 5 where the XOR operation is performed
on the output of LFSR which input bit is XOR of the previous
state, and the previously used session key. Next, MMAC
operation is performed on the XOR output using the primary
secret key. Finally, session key is generated from the XOR
operation of this MMAC result and MMAC result from
random value from the Table(T).
Algorithm 1: Session Key Generation Algorithm.
Data: primary secret key(PSK), linear feedback shift
register(LFSR), hash table(T )
Result: Dynamic Key
1 Calculate Ki ←MMAC(PSK, f(x1, x2, x3, ..., xm)⊕
Ki−1)⊕MMAC(PSK, ri)
2 if all random numbers in T used up then
3 for i = 1 to n do
4 T [i− 1]← H(T [i]⊕ T [i− 1])
5 end
6 end
2A rainbow table attack makes use of a large database that holds a large
number of a hash function’s input and corresponding outputs. Attacker
stores plaintext and the corresponding hash of plaintext in a table to avoid
generation of the hash again during looking up the hash next time.
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FIGURE 5: The session key generation.
The output of LFSR was encrypted by a pre-shared key to
generate one time password in [64] to monitor IoT devices in
smarthome. But the random output from LFSR depends on
the number of bits and it produces a limited random number.
Therefore, we presented our approach by including a pre-
defined random number and previously used key introduced
in [66]. The dynamic session key generation presented is a
lightweight process as it involves only LFSR and two MMAC
operations. The MAC operation is faster and requires less
processing power and memory than AES encryption [56].
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4) Secure Communication Protocol
Generation of a symmetric key during a session ensures
higher security for BSN device but a fresh key for every
session is computationally expensive for IoT devices. BSN
device and SDP device normally assign Key Validation
Time(KVT) to a new symmetric key of a medical sensor
that continuously streams physiological data such as ECG.
The communication protocol is depicted in Fig. 6 where the
source device checks the KVT of the old symmetric key
when it needs to transfer data. If the KVT is already expired,
the source and destination device execute the session key
generation algorithm and execute the authentication process
using the new symmetric key. Otherwise, the source device
executes the authentication process using the old symmetric
key. If the authentication is successful, the source device pre-
pares the data packet as shown in Table 2 and sends the packet
to destination device. The source and destination device use
H() of the nonce exchanged during authentication as their
identification so that attackers cannot correlate session data
to a BSN or SDP device.
ƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
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FIGURE 6: The communication protocol.
TABLE 2: The data packet format
H(Source Nonce) H(Destination Nonce)
Sequence Number HMAC(Ki,H(Data‖ Sequence Number))
Enc(K,Data)
C. PATIENT CENTRIC AGENT TO CUSTOMIZED
BLOCKCHAIN
The PCA connects the patient’s BSN with the customized
Blockchain network. The PCA decides what data is to put
into the Blockchain and, which Miner is to be selected.
Blockchain is not only a tamper proof distributed database
for patient’s record but also an authentic platform verified by
all the nodes in the Blockchain. Nodes of Blockchain might
be provided by healthcare providers, other organizations or
individuals. The nodes in our customized Blockchain are
normally classified as half nodes, general nodes, benign
nodes and miner nodes like Bitcoin Blockchain. Half nodes
normally indicate an individual user or a healthcare provider
that would like to use data stored in the Blockchain. Gen-
eral nodes are responsible for storing the chain of blocks
and broadcast blocks for validation. The Miners that are
powerful nodes in terms of CPU processing mine a block.
Miner and general nodes ensure that a data packet originates
from a legitimate node using the verification process. In our
RPM architecture, benign nodes can be distinguished from
other nodes by the Trust Management of Healthcare Control
Unit(HCU).
The Blockchain in Bitcoin demands a lot of processing
power to mine a block. Further, the transaction process-
ing time of the Bitcoin is longer to handle stream data
in continuous RPM in real time. Healthcare professionals
normally need to quickly retrieve streamed data from the
Blockchain. These challenges motivated us to design a cus-
tomized Blockchain with Patient Centric Agent to process
the patient’s stream data in real time. In the customized
Blockchain, the patient has full control of his or her record.
The following sections contain the basic components of
Blockchain technology used in the proposed architecture.
The components include miner selection for the proof of
work, transaction and bock. We first describe the Bitcoin
Protocol before illustrating our customized version.
• Half nodes or general nodes make a transaction with
the sender’s signature and broadcast the transaction
throughout the Blockchain network.
• Miner nodes gather certain amount of transactions and
process transactions in a block. All miner nodes start
solving a difficult hashing problem called Proof of Work
[67] by incrementing a variable field called the nonce
of the block. The Miner that successfully generates the
target hash containing pre-specified number of leading
zeroes first broadcasts the block to Bitcoin network and
receives a financial reward for doing so.
• All nodes in Blockchain verify the block and add the
block to the current Blockchain.
1) Miner Selection in Customized Blockchain
The Proof of Work in digital cryptocurrencies consumes
huge processing power because all of the miners compete
to be first to generate the target hash of block to prevent the
tampering of the record. Proof of Stake and Proof of Capacity
or space are alternative consensus protocols used in some
cryptocurrencies.
The Proof of Stake [68] does not depend on the processing
power of the miners. The Miner that owns and locks the
highest share of coin to the system has the higher chance to
mine the next block. For example, if there are three miners
namely m1, m2, and m3 which own 25%, 10% and 15%
share respectively, then, the first miner builds the next block.
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With the Proof of Capacity or space [69] approach, the
Miner with the greatest memory or disk space capacity is
selected to add the block to the chain.
In our End-to-End healthcare architecture, we propose to
select a group of trusted miners based on some characteristics
and the miner selection is done by the PCA. The PCA collects
resource information and ratings given by other PCAs about
miner nodes from TM(Trust Management) module as shown
in Fig. ?? in HCU and also send it’s rating about the selected
miner to TM. The PCA aggregates patient physiological data
and builds a block, the block is transferred to a miner node
listed in the group. The selected miner node runs Proof of
Work as in Bitcoin. The process reduces the power consump-
tion of Blockchain as one Miner produces the Target Hash.
The HCU explained in III-E executes Miner Selection Al-
gorithm for healthcare professional’s registration transaction.
The traditional bank acts as a Miner on behalf of its customer
for payment transactions that is discussed in Section III-C4.
The Miner Selection Algorithm executed by the PCA is
described in III-C1a.
a: Characteristics Based Miner Selection
We present our characteristics based Miner selection in Al-
gorithm 2, the nonce generation for block’s target hash in Al-
gorithm 5 and block verification Algorithm in 4 respectively.
• In the proposed Miner Selection Algorithm(MSA), the
PCA first obtains Miners’ disk space, locked currency
amount from it’s NM(Network Manager) and the trust’s
estimation(T ) from the TM of HCU. The trust’s estima-
tion(T) is discussed in III-C1b.
• Secondly, the ratio(in percentage) of locked currency,
and memory capacity of available Miners is calculated
respectively.
• Thirdly, a linear equation involving locked currency and
memory ratio is solved to maximize the total ratio of a
miner by using linear programming subject to total ratio
of the memory and currency is equal to 1 and individual
share of memory or currency is equal or less than 34 .
• Fourthly, the result of the linear equation is normalized
and is added with normalized trust’s estimation(T) of a
miner to measure the ultimate rating for the miner. Later,
a set of the fittest miners are selected randomly or using
hiring selection algorithm(1e algorithm) after estimating
the rating of all available miners.
• The PCA executes the algorithm to select only one
miner from the set of the fittest Miners every time it
has a block. In the RPM e-healthcare framework, data
transaction processing rate is higher than any other
Blockchain applications because of huge stream of real
time data from BSN. This selection of a Miner from the
list reduces the computational cost in Blockchain as well
as the PCA.
• The PCA waits for a certain time after handling over
the block to the selected Miner . If the PCA does not
receive the block to verify as one of the validator within
a pre-specified time,the PCA nominates another Miner
from the fittest list. Here, the nominated Miner trans-
mits the block to its neighbor nodes in the Blockchain
network. The neighbor nodes continue to broadcast the
block in the Blockchain network. In the meantime, the
Miner comes up with target hash of the block and later
just broadcasts the identifier, target hash and nonce of
the block in the Blockchain network. The nodes in
Blockchain already having the block verify the target
hash and confirm the addition of the block to the patient
Blockchain. The advantage of the approach is that: pa-
tient’s block can be available to healthcare professionals
in real-time. The disadvantage of this is that: it causes
network overhead in the Blockchain. But the availability
of a patient’s record in the Blockchain network is a vital
requirements in RPM.
b: Trust Model
The PCA needs to discover reliable nodes among the avail-
able Miners as it needs to choose only one miner to perform
Proof of Work. We propose a trust model as illustrated in Fig.
7 to discover the most reliable miners. The model executed
by HCU ranks a miner on the basis of the rate given by
those PCA(miner’s client) that already selected the Miner,
and summation of probability of some other trust parameters
illustrated in Table 3. The PCA queries HCU to get trust’s es-
timation (T) for a miner. The Miner’s client provides the TM
of HCU with feedback of the Miner regarding turn around
time and mining charges information. The Miner’s client
that already experienced comparatively less turn around time
gives a higher rating to the Miner. The Miner that voluntarily
mines block is also given the highest rating.
PCA
M1
R1
TM
T R2
R3
Number of block processed, 
modified, offline information of 
miners
A3
A2
A3
BC
FIGURE 7: The trust model.
In Fig. 7, let the miner m1 is already picked up by
some PCAs such as A1, A2, A3, ..., An and the normalized
turn around time TAT1, TAT2, TAT3, ..., TATn. The trust
model is defined as in (1)
14 VOLUME X, 2018
2169-3536 (c) 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2846779, IEEE Access
Author et al.: IEEE Access
Algorithm 2: Characteristics Based Miner Selection Al-
gorithm.
Data: currentCurrency, currrentCapacity, turst(T[]) of m
numbers of available miners
Result: List of reliable Miners
1 Intialize count← 0
2 if there is no available miner then
3 minerSelection[count++]← patientAgent
4 else
5 for each miner i = 1 to m do
6 if currentCapacity[i] ≥ Th then
7 capacity[i]⇐ currentCapacity[i]m∑
j=1
currentCapacity[j]
× 100
8 currency[i]← currentCurrency[i]m∑
j=1
currentCurrency[j]
× 100
9 end
10 Maximize ratings[i]← xcapacityi + ycurrencyi
subject to x ≤ 4
3
, y ≤ 4
3
and
11 x+ y = 1
12 end
13 /* Normalize ratings and trust where A and B, C and D are
the lowest and highest value of ratings[i] and T [i]
respectively. 1−R represents the scale of the
normalization. */
14 for for each miner i = 0 to m do
15 ratings[i]← 1 + (ratings[i]−A)×(R−1)
(B−A)
T [i]← 1 + (T [i]−C)×(R−1)
(D−C)
ratings[i]← ratings[i] + T [i]
16 end
17 numSkip← m× 1
e
18 for t = 1 to numTrials do
19 Shuffle(ratings)
20 bestRating ← ratings[1]
21 candidate← −1
22 readyToHire← false
23 for each miner i = 0 to m do
24 if i ≥ numSkip then
25 readyToHire← true
26 end
27 if ratings[i] > bestRating then
28 candidate← i
29 bestRating ← ratings[i]
30 if readyToHire=true then
31 break
32 end
33 end
34 end
35 if candidate=-1 then
36 continue;
37 end
38 if ratings[candidate] ≥ thresholdRating then
39 minerSelection[count++]← candidate
40 end
41 end
42 end
TABLE 3: The trust model parameters
Symbol Description
NB Total Number of Block within a Time Limit
Npb Total Number of Block Processed by a Miner
Nmb Total Number of Block Modified by a Miner
Toffline Total Offline Duration with 24 Hours
Nvb Total Number of Verified Block by a Miner
RTAT Rate from Turn Around Time
Rm Mining Charge Rate
T1 = d+
TV1 ×R(A1) + TV1 ×R(A2) + ...+ TV1 ×R(An)
(1− d)
(1)
Where TV1 is estimated by the summation of probability
of the some parameters stated in the Table 3 as follows:
TV = (1− P (Nmb
Npb
)) + (1− P (Toffline24 )) + P (N
v
b
NB
)
and R(Ai) = WRi + (1 − W )R0 where R(Ai) is the
rating of ith client PCA.
Here, Ri is the average rate given by ith client PCA on
two parameters(Turn Around Time and Mining Charge Rate)
and Ri =
RTATi +R
m
i
2 . The client PCA defines rating R
TAT
i ,
Rmi from 1 to 5 according to Turn Around Time and Mining
Charge Rate as shown in the Table 4.
TABLE 4: The ratings given by individual neighbor agent
Mining Charge Rating
Criteria Ratings
Volunteer Mining 5
Low Mining Charge 4
Low Medium Mining Charge 3
Medium Mining Charge 2
High Mining Charge 1
Turn Around Time
Criteria Ratings
t1 to t2 5
t3 to t4 4
t5 to t6 3
t7 to t8 2
t9 to t10 1
R0 is the average of previously obtained ratings from other
client PCA and W is a weight in between 0 < W ≤ 1. If
the current average is greater than the prior average then TM
randomly assigns W: 34 ≤ W ≤ 1 and d is a probability
factor and the value of d is 1N where N is the number of
available miners.
c: Random Miner Selection
The PCA might avoid computational overhead of the charac-
teristic based Miner selection process using Random Miner
Selection(RMS) policy. However, this introduces the risk that
a malicious node may be nominated. The responsibility of
mining a Block given to K number of Miners can make the
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system secure. The PCA can let a small set of Miners to
compete to mine a Block unlike Bitcoin where all Miners
compete. The PCA might execute RMS in case the informa-
tion from HCU for characteristic based Miner Selection is
not available.
Algorithm 3: Random Selection of Miner Node.
Data: list of available miner node
Result: list of selected miner
1 for each miner i = 1 to k do
2 selectedMiner[i]← minerList[i]
3 end
4 srand(time(NULL))
5 for i = k to m do
6 j ← rand()mod(i+ 1)
7 if j < k then
8 selectedMiner[j]← minerList[i]
9 end
10 end
d: Verification of Block
The Miner selected by PCA produces the target hash
of block according to Algorithm 4. Target Hash is
produced from Version (V), Type(T), Previous Block
Hash(PBH), Timestamp(TS), Trie Tree Root(TTR), Target
Difficulty(DT), Block Owner Address(BOA), and Transac-
tion Time Frame(TTF) of the block. Next, the miner broad-
casts the block for all other nodes in Blockchain network to
verify the block according to Algorithm 5. Information of
the next block verified by the nominated miner includes the
previous block hash, difficulty level of target hash, legitimacy
of all transactions and sender’s payment. A Blockchain node
adds the next block to the existing chain of Blocks if the
verification process is successful.
Algorithm 4: Nonce Generation Algorithm.
Data: Previous Block Hash, Difficulty Level(number of
leading zero(n))
Result: Target nonce and Target tHash
1 Initialize nonce← 0 and target← false
2 Build Trie Tree of the Transactions
3 Run Transaction Fee Protocol
4 blockHeader←
Hash(V ‖T‖PBH‖TS‖TTR‖TD‖BOA‖TTF )
5 while target = false do
6 if Hash(blockHeader‖nonce) =
hashwith leading nnumber zeroes then
7 target← true
8 tHash← Hash(blockHeader‖nonce)
9 else
10 nonce++
11 end
12 end
13 return nonce‖ tHash
2) Description of Transactions
In Bitcoin, a transaction is made when a sender wants to
transfer cryptocurrencies to a recipient. Every transaction has
Algorithm 5: Block Verification Algorithm
Data: nonce, tHash
Result: blockAcceptance
1 Initialize sigStatus← false, dStatus←
false, iStatus← false, tStatus← false
2 dLevel← extractDifficulty(blockHeader(Difficulty))
3 tStaus← checkTime(T imestamp)
4 sigStatus← blockSignatureVerification()
5 dSatus← checkDifficulty(dLevel)
6 iStatus← checkTransactionIntegrity(TrieTreeRoot)
7 blockHash← Hash
(V ‖T‖PBH‖TS‖TTR‖TD‖BOA‖TTF‖nonce)
8 if sigStatus = true ∧ blockHash = tHash ∧ dStatus =
true ∧ tStatus = true ∧ iStatus = true then
9 blockAcceptance← true
10 else
11 blockAcceptance← false
12 end
two parts called input and output. Public/Private key pairs
are used to hide the identity of the transaction owner. The
sender and receiver are identified with their public key. A
valid transaction has an authorized sender signature and a
valid source of digital currency. The transaction format of
Bitcoin is illustrated in Table 5.
TABLE 5: The general format of Bitcoin transaction
Transaction Identifier
Input Output
Bitcoin Source Receiver Address
Signature Sender pubKey Script Receiver pubKey
Likewise, we introduce different transactions called Data
Transaction(DT) for physiological data, Registration Trans-
action(RT) that authorizes healthcare provider such as
physician, and diagnostic center, Access Grant Transac-
tion(AGT) for granting a healthcare provider’s Role Based
Access(RBA) to patient’s record, and Payment Transac-
tion(PT). The health providers send the PCA patient’s other
records such as prescriptions, and medical test results.
Healthcare provider uses the PCA’s public key for preserving
the confidentiality of patient’s record. The PCA has autho-
rization only to make transactions of Blockchain for patient’s
records. Each type of transaction is discussed in this section.
a: Data Transaction
Data Transaction(DT) format is illustrated in Table 6. SDP
device(smartphone) makes DT that consists of physiological
data coming from BSN during a time interval (ti to tj).
The SDP device puts it signature in DT’s Signature field
and sends DT to Patient Centric Agent(PCA). The PCA signs
the DT after the verification of SDP device’s signature. The
signature verification process is illustrated in Fig. 9
The multi-signature script introduced in [70] for the field
MultiSignature in DT is defined as follows:
rScript = OP_1pubKeym
||pubKeya||OP_2||OP_CHECKMULTISIG
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TABLE 6: The format of Data Transaction
TimeStamp SensorId
SDP Address PCA Address
MultiSignature
Record Type
Hash of Cipher Data
Cipher of Data
Transaction Fee
CREDITLIMIT CREDIT
CREDITPRICE
Where, OP_1(n) indicates the required number of signa-
tures among OP_2(m) numbers of signatures. pubKeym and
pubKeya represent the public key of SDP device and PCA
respectively.
The signature formation is illustrated in Fig. 8. A SDP
device generates hash from the header of a transaction and
then encrypts that hash using its private key. The signature
built by a SDP device is as follows: MultiSignaturem =
Enc(privateKeym, H(Timestamp‖SensorId‖
SDP Address‖Hash of Data‖TransactionFee)).
Timestamp
SensorId
Source Address
Hash of the data
Transaction Fee
HashEncryption
Private Key
Signature
FIGURE 8: The signature formation process.
The PCA checks the signature and again encrypts the
signature with its private key to obtain MultiSignature =
Enc(privateKeya,MultiSignaturem). The node that ver-
ifies the signature first decrypts the signature using PCA’s
public key, next, it decrypts the hash by SDP device’s public
key.
The DT contains the encrypted health data called Cipher
of Data, the hash code of the encrypted data(Hash of Ci-
pher Data) to ensure data integrity. The Transaction Fee
varies as every transaction doesn’t carry the same amount of
health data. Three fields called CREDITLIMITS, CREDIT,
and CREDITRICE are used to estimate Transaction Fee.
CREDITLIMITS represents the maximum amount of cred-
its for a transaction such as Data Transaction, Registration
Transaction. Further, the health data in a specific transaction
such as Data Transaction might vary. So, CREDIT represent
the required amount for processing of a particular transaction.
Transaction Fee
Hash
Decryption
Public Key
Signature Hash
 both hash equal
Success
Yes
Hash of the data
Source Address
SensorId
Timestamp
FIGURE 9: The signature verification process.
CREDITPRICE represents the price per byte in a transac-
tion. For instance, the PCA sets CREDITLIMITS(2000)and
CREDITPRICE(100 Credit) for a DT with 10 bytes, the
CREDIT required to process the transaction is 10 × 100 =
200 VCP(Virtual Credit Point).
b: Registration Transaction
The Registration Transaction(RT) format is illustrated in
Table 7. RT represents the legitimate healthcare provider. The
RT is issued by Healthcare Control Unit(HCU) and stored
in Blockchain. The signature of HCU in RT ensures the
legitimacy of healthcare provider.
TABLE 7: The format of Registration Transaction
Record Type Timestamp
HCU Address
HCU Signature
Healthcare Provider Signature
Healthcare Provider Adress
Healthcare Provider Profile
Transaction Fee
CREDITLIMIT CREDIT
CREDITPRICE
c: Access Grant Transaction
The Access Grant Transaction(AGT) is shown in Table 8.
The PCA separates Input and Output in AGT like Bitcoin
transaction. The PCA includes MultiSignature of data source
in Input and a Cipher for healthcare provider to access data in
Output. The Cipher includes dynamically constructed Patient
Record Encryption Key(PREK) described in III-C2d, De-
viceMetaData such as Medical Sensor Id, Data Window Time
Frame etc., and Time that indicates the validation period
of Patient Record Encryption Key. The PCA produces the
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Cipher using the healthcare provider’s public key so that only
the legitimate healthcare provider obtains the access to health
data. The AGT also contains an Access Granting Code(AGC)
and Record Type explained in III-C2d. The AGC varies based
on the role of healthcare provider. For instance, the AGC for
nurse is different from that of a physician.
TABLE 8: The format of Grant Access Transaction
Record Type Timestamp
Access Granting Code
Input Output
Source Address Destination Address
MultiSignature Enc(pubKeydest, PREK ‖ deviceMetadata‖Time)
Transaction Fee
CREDITLIMIT CREDIT
CREDITPRICE
d: Patient Record Encryption Key Generation
The PCA makes Data Transaction(DT) by gathering data in
predefined time frames. The challenge is to encrypt every
transaction by using individual keys so that healthcare pro-
fessionals can access only limited records that are assigned.
One key assigned to a medical sensor might give healthcare
provider access to huge records for a long time. Encryption of
transaction according to its time frame window ensures fine
granular access of patient’s record. In addition, healthcare
providers have different access levels based on their roles.
The PCA is also required to construct Patient Record Encryp-
tion Key(PREK) based on Record Type(RT) and healthcare
provider’s role. The PCA needs to dynamically construct
Patient Record Encryption Key(PREK) during processing a
transaction as the storage of individual keys per transaction
requires huge memory.
The PCA produces the PREK through Hash operation of
its Secret Key, Sensor ID, and Time Frame that includes the
date and window time frame(22−03−2018 : 10.30−10.45)
of a transaction.
PREK = H(PCASecretKey||Sensor ID||Record
Type||TimeFrame)
Where PREK represents Patient Record Encryption Key
for a pre-specified time frame. The PCA encrypts a trans-
action by using a dynamically constructed PREK. PREK
can be regenerated by the PCA whenever the PCA grants
a healthcare provider access to patient health records. The
PCA can share its secret key with SDP and BSN so that BSN
and SDP can encrypt physiological data generating PREK.
As PREK involves only H() operation, generation of PREK
is also feasible for BSN.
The Healthcare Provider’s Wallet can only decrypt the
patient’s record and the HPW deletes the record after elapse
of time in AGT illustrated in Table 8. In RPM, healthcare
professionals deal with diverse genre of patient records such
as raw records, prescription records, and diagnostic result.
PCA assigns a code to a patient’s record: raw record(00),
prescription record(01), diagnostic result(10) etc.
The PCA defines the user of health data based on the
healthcare provider’roles drawn from an eHealth standard
such as openEHR [71]. This includes Healthcare Provider
Organization such as Diagnostic Center(DC) or Hospital(H),
Individual Healthcare Provider such as Physician(P) or
Nurse(N), and Healthcare Consumer such as Relatives(R)
or Others(O). Finally, the PCA merges patient’s record code
and selected healthcare user code to make Access Granting
Code(AGC) of AGT shown in Table 8 . For instance, if the
PCA gives a patient’s Physician, Nurse and Relatives access
to medication prescription, the PCA produces the code(01-
110010) illustrated in Table 9. The AGC and the HPW will
reject access if someone’s role does not satisfy the AGC.
TABLE 9: The Access Granting Code
RT P N DC H R O
01 1 1 0 0 1 0
3) Data Block Structure
Bitcoin Miners collect transactions from different users
worldwide and build a block with 1024 transactions. The
Miner creates a Merkle Tree that is a binary tree to pack the
transactions in a block. The Merkle Tree ensures the integrity
of the transactions in a block. A Blockchain with Merkle Tree
in Bitcoin is depicted in Fig. 10. Here, we assume that there
are four transactions: Tx1, ..., tx4. To create Merkle Tree,
first, a hash value for each transaction is produced. Secondly,
hash function is applied on the concatenated hash value of
two transactions and this process is continued until only one
hash value is generated from all the transactions. The final
hash value is the root of the Merkle tree. The Merkle Tree
root is inserted into one field of the block. The nonce field
that is also called counter is the only variable in the block.
Nonce is incremented by the miner as one of the inputs of
hash function until it produces a target hash of the block.
The previous hash field contains the target hash value of the
latest block of the blockchain. In this way, a chain of blocks
is created, which protects an individual block to be tampered.
nonce
Hash of the previous 
block
Root of Merkle Tree
nonce
Hash of the previous 
block(Block 1)
Root of Merkle Tree
nonce
Hash of the previous 
block(Block 2)
Root of Merkle Tree
Tx1
H(Tx1)
Tx2
H(Tx2)
Tx3
H(Tx3)
Tx4
H(Tx4)
H(H(Tx1)||H(Tx2)) H(H(Tx3)||H(Tx4))
H(H(Tx1)||H(Tx2))||(H(H(Tx3)||H(Tx4)))
Chain of Block
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
FIGURE 10: The Blockchain in Bitcoin
In our customized Blockchain for IoT healthcare frame-
work, we propose a Trie Tree instead of a Merkle Tree to
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retrieve data quickly while maintaining the integrity of data.
Data Transaction Block(DTB) consists of only physiological
data transactions. Similarly, other Blocks such as Regis-
tration Transactions(RT), Access Grant Transactions(AGT)
consist of respective kinds of transactions. Fields of a Data
Block are depicted in Table 10. The Type in Block represents
the kind of transactions ( DT, RT, AGT). The PCA inserts a
Trie Tree root in place of the Merkle Tree root in the Block.
The Merkle Tree demands huge processing power and is
not suitable for RPM because of huge volume of streamed
data and takes longer time to retrieve data to preserve data
integrity.
TABLE 10: The format of Data Block
Block Header of Blockchain
Field Description
Version Block Version Number
Type Transaction type
Previous Block Hash Hash of the previous block in the chain
Timestamp Creation time of the block
Trie Tree Root Root of the Trie tree containing transaction
Target Difficulty The Proof-of-Work difficulty target
Nonce A counter for the Proof-of-Work
Block Owner Address
Transactions Timeframe
The transaction in Block is arranged in the Trie Tree
according to a device identifier. The leaf of Trie Tree
holds the hash value of the transactions in the Block.
In Fig. 11, we show that there are three sensor devices
namely EEG,EMG, and HRV and every alphanumeric char-
acter of a sensor identifier creates a label in the tree.
Transactions of a medical sensor is labeled as T1 − T2,
T2 − T3,...,Tn − Tn + 1 at leaves of that sensor ac-
cording to transaction generated time frame window. In
Fig. 11, the parent node of the leaves contain the hash
value(H(H(TX1)||H(TX2)||H(TX3)||H(TX4)...)) of
the concatenation of its children hash value. Likewise, an
ancestor node contains the hash value of the concatenation
of its descendants’ hash value as well as it’s label. The sig-
nificant advantage of Trie Tree lies is that ; transactions can
be searched at the complexity that is equal to the length(L)
of a sensor identification O(|L|). Trie Tree also preserves
the integrity of data as parent node and leaf node contain
hash value of the transaction. We can check the integrity
of the transactions just by observing the root like Merkle
tree. Further, Trie Tree involves fewer hash operations than
Merkle Tree.
4) Transaction Fee Protocol:
In IoT Blockchain healthcare, the management of huge
streamed data is prime target to make the system efficient
and effective. Blockchain in IoT healthcare also need to
deal with Transaction Fee and healthcare provider’s fee in a
secure manner. Digital Currency(DC) in Bitcoin or Ethereum
is still not as widespread as traditional currency. Therefore,
6HQVRU((*
6HQVRU(0*
6HQVRU+59
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Hash
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Hash
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Hash of the 
previous block
Root of Trie Tree
nonce
Hash of the previous 
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Root of Trie Tree
nonce
Hash of the previous 
block(Block 2)
Root of Trie Tree
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
FIGURE 11: Trie tree structure
we propose to incorporate the conventional banking system
into our IoT Blockchain healthcare system. In the proposed
payment protocol, we assume that the patient, Miner and
healthcare provider own Virtual Credit Account(VCA) in
the Banking system. Every node in Blockchain network is
associated with one or more traditional banks. Due to secu-
rity threat, traditional Smart Card/Credit Card for financial
transactions are discarded in favour of virtual credit. The
PCA buys Virtual Credit Pints(VCP) from a bank using the
patient’s Smart Card/ Credit Card. The payment protocol of
the proposed e-healthcare system is illustrated in Fig. 12. and
is described as follows:
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FIGURE 12: Payment protocol
1) Patient Centric Agent(PCA) purchases Credit Points(CP)
from Bank A in exchange for traditional currency.
2) PCA constructs a Payment Transaction(PT) as shown
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in Fig. 13 . The PT holds PCA’s signature and Bank A’s
signature. The PCA sends PT to Miner M nominated
by the PCA for target hash generation.
3) The Miner M puts its signature after verification of
the PCA’s signature and Bank A’s signature in PT.
The Miner M transfers the PT(Payment Transaction)
to Miner’s Bank B.
4) Bank B verifies all signatures on the PT and inserts its
signature into the PT. The Bank B requests Bank A to
make a Deposit Transaction(DT) for Miner M.
5) Bank A prepares a new transaction called UTXO(Unspent
transaction) for the PCA and Output Transaction(OT)
for Miner M. Finally, Bank A builds a block with all
transactions produced to complete the payment and
sends the block leaving the Previous Transaction Hash
field empty to Miner M and the PCA.
6) The PCA and Miner M generate their respective hash
value by placing the Previous Hash Block in local
Blockchain. Banks in Blockchain maintain a global
Blockchain for processing of UTXO and OT like Bit-
coin.
Input Output
Source 
Signature
PubKey
Source Bank Address
PubKey Amount
Time Reference of Credit Transaction
Receiver signature put later 
at receiver end
Receiver Bank Address put later at bank end
FIGURE 13: Format of Payment Transaction
D. CUSTOMIZED BLOCKCHAIN TO HEALTHCARE
PROVIDER
Healthcare Provider Agent(HPA): Healthcare Provider
Agent is healthcare provider Centric server to store and ana-
lyze patient health data. The HPA’s functionalities are similar
to PCA. For example, HPA nominates a Miner in Blockchain
and performs Key Management at the healthcare’s end etc.
Healthcare Provider Wallet(HPW): The HPW has three
modules called Blockchain Interface Module(BIM), Regis-
tration Interface Module(RIM) and Ex-filtration Detection
Module(EDM) shown in Fig. 2. BIM(Blockchain Interface
Module) provides the healthcare provider with Blockchain
access and processes transactions for the Blockchain.
EDM(Ex-filtration Detection Module) proposed in [72], [73]
prevents insider attacker from breaching patient’s informa-
tion. Patient health data privacy can be breached by the
healthcare service providers in attacks known as Insider
Attacks. The RIM( Registration Interface Module) performs
healthcare provider registration with the PCA(Patient Cen-
tric Agent) and HCU(Healthcare Control Unit) to safeguard
against healthcare provider attempts to use patient’s data
without permission.
E. HEALTHCARE CONTROL UNIT
Healthcare Control Unit placed in the upper tier of the RPM
architecture proposed here is a Trust Center for heathcare
provider and the PCA. Trust Management(TM) of HCU
monitors the activities of miners and the PCA in Blockchain,
authorizes and certifies healthcare providers.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, firstly, we analysis the performance of pro-
posed Patient Centric Agent based monitoring architecture in
terms of energy and End to End delay. Secondly, we discuss
the security strength of the architecture in terms of some
common attacks. After that, the simulation environment and
results for the performance analysis are presented.
A. END TO END ENERGY ANALYSIS
In our architecture, we allocate less processing to the body
area sensor devices because of energy and processing power
constraints. The sensor devices in BSN generate symmet-
ric key in lightweight computation for authentication. The
authentication process involves HMAC operation and voice
identification module which are not expensive in terms of
speed and energy consumption. In the architecture, SDP
device only receives physiological data from BSN and send
data to the PCA . As SDP device such as smartphone is
also energy constrained and memory limited, we let SDP
device run only cryptography related algorithm to transfer
data securely to PCA. Classification of physiological data,
Block Generation, Block Verification, communication with
Blockchain are some energy and processing power-hungry
tasks and those are accomplished by Patient Centric Agent.
This ensures more reliable processing of patient health data
than traditional architecture where mobile devices normally
act as coordinating node and the device has high chance to
fail. Data that the PCA deems uneventful will not be stored
in the Blockchain resulting in the consumption of less energy
than conventional Blockchain architectures. Since, the PCA
nominates only one Miner node to mine a block, the overall
energy consumption of the customized Blockchain is further
reduced. In addition, we propose Trie Tree based transaction
packing where fewer hashing operations are required leading
to further energy savings.
B. END TO END DELAY
Bitcoin processes around 3to4 and Ethereum [74] processes
around 20 transactions per second. Normally, the number of
processing transactions per second depends on the consensus
process and difficulty level of Target Hash and Hash(Ethash,
SHA-3, Blake2 etc.). In our customized Blockchain, the PCA
selects only one miner. Hence, Blockchain does not demand
the high difficulty level because of the absence of minor
competition. So, the number of transactions per second in
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our Blockchain is more than that in Bitcoin. In emergency
cases, the PCA can bypass the Blockchain and directly send
data to an authorized healthcare provider. Later, the PCA can
store the emergency data into the Blockchain. This approach
also significantly improves the End to End delay of health
data processing. In addition, a patient record can be quickly
retrieved from the Trie Tree which also helps the minimum
End to End response.
C. ATTACK ANALYSIS
Man in the Middle attack: Man in the middle attack nor-
mally happens when sender and receiver exchange keys. In
our architecture, we let devices at different segment come up
with the same key during every session to safeguard against
man in the attack.
Replay attack: HMAC authentication is susceptible to
a replay attack if it is not modified by some other means.
An authentication protocol with time and session random
number is designed to prevent an attacker from replaying.
Eavesdropping: The channel between BSN devices, SDP
devices and PCA exchanges encrypted health data. So, at-
tackers cannot modify health data after intercepting data
packet. Attackers cannot gain knowledge about the source
and destination from the intercepted data packet because of
dynamic identification.
Spoofing attack: Attackers sometimes change the identity
of the data owner; this is known as a spoofing attack. In our
architecture, the source and destination agree on dynamic
identification and GPS while performing authentication . As
a result, an attacker cannot inject the wrong source address
or destination address. The Mining fee discourages attackers
from making a fake transaction however the attempt would
be discarded anyway during the verification stages owing to
invalid signature.
Compromised Key attack: As described above, periodi-
cally generated symmetric key is used to perform authenti-
cation among devices at different segment. Attackers cannot
have the key without capturing hardware and software control
of the devices. BSN allows access of the device based on
proximity. Therefore, attacker will not able to get unautho-
rized access to BSN device because of its physical location.
Attacker can control all devices by compromising one device
if only one shared key is used by all BSN and SDP devices.
So, we consider device wise dynamic key generation. In this
case, even adversary compromises one device, other devices
are still protective from the attack. Moreover, the Security
Service Module of PCA analyzes the network traffic from
SDP and BSN to separate the affected device at patient’s end.
Denial of Service attack: A DoS attack cannot succeed
in Blockchain because attackers cannot stop the activities
of all the nodes in the Blockchain network by sending fake
blocks. BSN and SDP are safe from DoS attack because the
PCA blocks fake requests and all traffic goes through the
PCA. In Blockchain, although the PCA and SDP devices
are susceptible to denial of service attack, due to patients
intervention, such attack can be mitigated.
Patient Privacy: Patient Centric Agent can preserve pa-
tient’s privacy using public key/private key encryption in
Blockchain. Blockchain processes, verifies and stores block
anonymously. In Blockchain, attackers cannot link patient’s
prescription record to patient’s relevant physiological data.
As patient’s identity of real-life is hidden in the system, the
attacker does not benefit even if it gains some data access.
Further, BSN device, SDP device and PCA communicate
with each other using their sessional identifier. Consequently,
session identification helps patients conceal the device’s real
identification to attackers.
Reliable Service: Our system provides reliable service
for the patient. The Blockchain is a distributed ledger and
open to all. Consequently, an attacker might claim to be a
specialist healthcare professionals to gain the patients data or
to earn money. Further, patients prefer a healthcare provider
with a good reputation. So, an attacker might appear as a
reputed healthcare professional. To safeguard against this, we
propose Healthcare Control Unit that authorizes legitimate
healthcare professionals.
D. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT AND RESULTS
First, we discuss the simulation environment and perfor-
mance of Miner Selection Algorithm executed in PCA. Later,
we discuss the performance of security protocol at patient’s
end(BSN, SDP and PCA).
1) Simulation & Performance analysis for Miner Selection
Algorithm in customized Blockchain
We implement the Miner Selection Algorithm executed by
the PCA using Java programming environment. We use Java
8 Development Kit 64 bit and Netbeans IDE 8.1 as edi-
tor. We ran the Bitcoin proof of work on three machines
specified in Table 11. Profiler of Netbeans IDE 8.1 act as
performance analysis tools in our simulation. We analyze
the performances of our Miner Selection Algorithm(MSA)
with Ethash used in Ethereum [74] as Proof of Work and
Bitcoin Proof of Work in terms of CPU time and memory.
Ethash in Ethereum is faster than SHA-3 used in Bitcoin.
Ethash is memory bound operation whereas SHA-3 is CPU
bound operation [74]. In Java profile, we can monitor the
CPU time and memory of the host machine consumed by the
application program. We define the following metrics for the
performance evaluation:
TABLE 11: The Miner specification
SL No Component Description
M1
Processor Intel(R)Core(TM)I3-2310M CPU@2.10 GHz 2.10
Memory 4.00GB
M2
Processor Intel(R)Core(TM)I5-7200U CPU@2.50 GHz 2.71
Memory 8.00GB
M3
Processor Intel(R)Core(TM)I7-4770 CPU@3.40 GHz 3.40
Memory 16.00GB
CPU Time Monitoring represents the required amount
of CPU time to execute a program. The dark line indicates
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the percentage of CPU usage of the specific application. The
CPU time for individual method of an application is traced in
the profiling tools.
Memory Monitoring indicates the amount of heap used
by an application. The light portion estimates the available
heap and the dark portion estimates the amount used by the
dynamic objects.
Surviving Generations indicates the number of genera-
tions that are currently alive on the heap where generation
means a set of instances produced between two garbage
collections.
In our simulation, we consider three miners and a Patient
Centric Agent as Clients-Server where all the clients act as
miners send the necessary information to the PCA to calcu-
late the ratings of the miner for the selection process. Blocks
with different numbers of transactions(252, 512, 1024) is
used in the simulation. The number of leading zeroes in the
Target Hash was set at 6. The telemetry view of the MSA and
PoW(Proof of Work) in our Continuous Patient Monitoring
with a Patient Centric Agent(CPMwPCA) is illustrated in
Fig. 14. The proof of work of Bitcoin is executed in three
miner nodes and the telemetry view of two of those miners
are illustrated in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16. It is observed that the
memory and CPU utilization of the Bitcoin proof of work
is higher than our MSA+PoW(the proposed miner selection
algorithm and Proof of Work using Ethash utilized around
25% of CPU and 98MB memory whereas the average CPU
utilization and memory of three miners in Bitcoin Proof of
Work is around 45% and 195MB respectively). The MSA
is executed for the first block. The PCA does not run MSA
for the rest of the blocks. We use Trie Tree to store transac-
tions, which incurs less cost than Merkle Tree and only one
machine executes the Proof of Work. As a result, The pro-
posed solutions significantly save power consumption of the
Blockchain. Power saving is appropriate for a personalized
Blockchain like remote patient monitoring where individuals,
government, different institutions, and healthcare providers
contribute to Blockchain’s node. In Fig. 17, we show a com-
parison between CPU time MSA+PoW and Bitcoin Proof of
Work. Our algorithm improves over the Bitcoin PoW because
we select a group of miners when MSA is executed. Later, we
let them mine patient data transactions one by one and Ethash
are faster than SHA-3 in Bitcoin. Further,as the system allows
only one miner to generate the target hash of the block, the
system does not require to increase the difficulty level with
the addition of new miners. Difficulty level remains constant
over time.
2) Performance Analysis of Security Protocol at Patient End
Our security protocol at the patient’s end is implemented
in Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6500CPU@3.20GHz machine by
using Java. We show the comparative study of performance
analysis of our protocol with ACLF [75] and BSN-Care
[12] in terms of reliability, a number of error packets and
throughput. The reliability of the proposed security protocol
as depicted in Fig. 18 improves over the ACLF and BSN-
Care because of our lightweight proximity based authenti-
cation, and multilevel storage(Patient Local Server, Cloud,
Blockchain). In ACLF, the pre-deployment of the triple key
is applied for the lifetime of the sensor, therefore, if the key
is exposed to attackers, adversaries might control all of the
devices and hence it reduces the normal rate of transferring
data in ACLF that affects the throughput illustrated in Fig.
19. In contrast, the BSN-Care proposed single server for the
storage of all patients’ record and therefore network con-
gestion reduces the throughput. In CPMwCPA, we present
the periodically generated key mechanism instead of sharing
information except during deployment to protect the de-
vices from eavesdropping which reduces the communication
overhead as depicted in Fig. 20. In CPMwPCA, proximity
based authentication ensures SDP devices receive data from
legitimate BSN devices and the probability of receiving error
packet as shown in Fig. 21 is comparatively low. On the
other hand, neither ACLF nor BSN-Care consider proximity
authentication in their security proposal.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a Patient-Centric Agent based
healthcare architecture. The architecture consists of BSN,
Smartphone(Sensor Data Provider), Patient Centric Agent,
Blockchain, and Healthcare Provider Interface. There are
multiple communication channels from End to End of this ar-
chitecture such as BSN to Smartphone, Smartphone to PCA,
PCA to Blockchain. Every channel requires security against
different network attacks such eavesdropping, Sybil, and man
in middle. Further, BSN is a power constraint network in
eHealthcare architecture. High computational encryption and
authentication are not appropriate for BSN network. So, our
research focuses on the proposal of lightweight encryption
and authentication for BSN to Smartphone channel as well
as Smartphone to PCA. Secondly, BSN produces a huge
stream of data and needs to perform some pre-processing
on data before sending data to Blockchain. Further, the
processing rate of a block produced from real-time data might
be slower than that of data arrival in Blockchain. Therefore,
we focus on the development of an intelligent Patient Centric
Agent that coordinates among the BSN and Smartphone. The
PCA categorizes patient’s data as eventful and uneventful,
defines security level, controls access for patient data and
generates alarms during the emergency, nominates miners in
Blockchain to optimize the overall energy of the customized
Blockchain. Blockchain network confirms the privacy of
patient documents, tamper-proof, availability, and guards
against a single point of failure. Energy and security analysis
of the proposed architecture was done to demonstrate its
applicability in continuous health monitoring system.
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FIGURE 14: The VM Telemetry of CPMwPCA PoW in Miner 2.
FIGURE 15: The VM Telemetry of Bitcoin PoW in Miner 2.
FIGURE 16: The VM Telemetry of Bitcoin PoW in Miner 3.
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